President Trump’s recent executive order (EO) asserting more formal control over so-called independent agencies has sparked controversy. Critics decry it as a “fundamental reshaping of the federal government” and even “illegal,” fearing that it will allow the president to direct regulatory decisions. But while the EO may look dramatic, in practice it changes little. Independent agencies have long been subject to political influence, and their supposed autonomy is more myth than reality.
For over a century, independent agencies have played a major role in American governance. The first, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), was established in 1887, and around 60 have followed, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Surface Transportation Board (STB).
These agencies are not sovereign entities; their authority comes from Congress, their funding is controlled by the executive and legislative branches, and their decisions are subject to judicial review. What distinguishes them from executive agencies is the difficulty of removing their leaders and of overruling their decisions. Agency heads can typically only be removed for reasons of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance, and courts—not the president—have the power to overturn their rulings. Congress can change agency decisions by changing laws or by means of the Congressional Review Act. Historically, they have also been exempt from oversight by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which reviews cost-benefit analyses of executive agency regulations.
But the notion that these agencies operate independently of politics is a convenient fiction. For decades, presidents and lawmakers have found ways to steer their agendas. During the latter years of the Obama administration, the White House and congressional Democrats pushed the FCC to adopt policies on net neutrality and cable set-top box regulation, and sometimes intervened in votes, such as on subsidies for low-income households. The Biden administration took political influence a step further, informally using independent agencies as part of its whole-of-government approach. The FTC, for instance, closely aligned its agenda with the White House, jettisoning legal precedent in favor of more politically and ideologically driven policies.
Trump’s EO can be seen as simply formalizing what has already been happening. It directs agency heads to align their priorities with the administration’s broader policy goals and subjects independent agencies to cost-benefit analysis oversight—something OIRA has long applied to executive agencies. This move may improve regulatory decision-making. Independent agencies have often lagged in conducting rigorous economic analysis, prompting former FCC Chairman Ajit Pai to voluntarily adopt OIRA’s standards.
Independence can serve important purposes and has done so in the past. Many were created to address issues of corruption and to ensure that regulation was performed by subject matter experts. When they perform as intended, the independent agencies stimulate business investment by making regulation more predictable and even handed. In effect, actual independence serves as a buffer against day-to-day political pressures while ensuring that longer-term political objectives are fulfilled.
Critics of the EO are reacting to an idealized version of regulatory independence that doesn’t exist in practice. The real issue isn’t whether presidents exert influence over these agencies—it’s that agency leaders have often ceded their independence voluntarily, undermining confidence in regulatory neutrality.
Instead of attacking Trump’s EO, critics should focus on developing means for creating effective independence to ensure these agencies, whether Trump’s EO withstands legal challenges or not, fulfill their intended role: providing a stable, predictable regulatory environment that supports long-term economic growth.
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