On February 25th, the Israeli airforce bombed military targets in the town of Kisweh, 20 miles south of Damascus and in the province of Daraa. These attacks come on the heels of a new Israeli declaration, to “not allow southern Syria to become southern Lebanon.”
After 14 years of civil war, the Syrian economy is in utter ruin. Bashar al-Assad and his regime were overthrown after a seemingly improbable attack from a coalition of rebel forces on December 8th, 2024. The overthrow of the Assad regime does not necessarily mean Syria is on the immediate path to peace and prosperity. Months later, Syria now has the ongoing challenge of building a government that can be trusted domestically and internationally, all while struggling to feed its people, as evidenced by long bread lines that are formed daily in Damascus. Significant challenges abound and include, but are not limited to, reconciling the multiple rebel groups into a unified Syrian force and national identity, negotiating with foreign powers who have military influence in Syria, such as Turkey, Israel, Russia, and the United States, and ensuring that the known Syrian oil and gas resources are not used to fund more war and terrorism.
Power Vacuum and the Threat of Increased Instability
Bashar al-Assad was not overthrown by one historically unified entity. Multiple forces are spread throughout Syria, all with competing agendas for the country’s future, making a long-term clean transition of power unlikely. The largest group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has territorial control of most of the key cities of Syria, including Damascus. Other groups include remnants of ISIS, the Syrian Defense Force (SDF), the Southern Operations Room (SOR), and the Turkish military in the north, which seeks the dissolution of SDF. Additionally, the United States has a military base in Al-Tanf, and the Russians are trying desperately to convince HTS to allow them to keep their air base in Latakia and naval base in Tartus; the naval base provides Russia with access to the Mediterranean without having to go through the Bosphorus Strait, and the air base enables them to project power into Africa.

After taking control of Damascus, Ahmed al-Sharaa abolished the constitution and declared himself president at a meeting of the armed factions who took part in the overthrow of Assad. Ahmed al-Sharaa also dissolved Assad’s Baath Party and will remain in control at least throughout the transitional period. Once his presidency was secured, and to demonstrate a willingness to be moderate and to put an end to the instability in Syria, Sharaa hosted a series of foreign dignitaries, including former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Leaf, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot, and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock.
A necessary effort by the new transitional Syrian government to establish itself as a stable nation included ending Iranian political and military influence. Cutting Tehran off from Syria is a heavy blow to Iranian grand strategy because it prevents them from efficiently supplying Hezbollah with weaponry. Iranian influence on the Assad regime granted Tehran power-projection capabilities in the region, serving as a balance against Israel; Israel is understandably still weary about the true intentions of Ahmed al-Sharaa and the future stability of their northern neighbor. Due to this uncertainty, Israeli forces are currently occupying parts of Southern Syria, including the strategically important Mt. Hermon summit, while destroying military hardware left behind by the former Syrian Arab Army.
Syrian Oil & Gas
Syria was historically the largest crude oil producer in the Eastern Mediterranean, having produced enough oil to meet its domestic demand and export internationally; most of the Syrian oil exports went to parts of Europe, with many of Europe’s refineries being built to process the specific types of crude coming from Syria. Before the civil war began in 2011, Syria produced an average of 383,000 barrels per day (b/d) and 316 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d) of natural gas. In 2015, Syria had an estimated 2.5 billion barrels of proven reserves of oil. For comparison, in 2010, the United States produced 5.5 million b/d, Russia hit a post-Soviet record of 10.1 million b/d, and Syria’s regional neighbors of Iraq and Iran produced 2.3 million b/d, and 3.6 million b/d. Additionally, in 2010, the Syrian government announced the discovery of shale oil resources, an estimated amount of as much as 50 billion tons. After conflict ensued, production collapsed to an estimated 20,000 b/d, forcing Syria to become a net importer of oil and become heavily reliant on Iran. The fall in production devastated the Syrian economy since oil and gas exports accounted for 25% of the country’s GDP.

Over the course of the thirteen-year Syrian civil war, Iran invested an estimated $30-$50 billion into bolstering Assad’s regime. Syria remained one of the few long-standing allies of Iran, and their military control of the Syrian-Iraqi border crossing at Deir al-Zor was critical to Iranian power projection throughout the region. Part of Iranian grand strategy included plans to turn Syria into a strategic partner in energy development as a means to continue their efforts to circumvent American sanctions. As a result, the two nations signed a $2.6 billion agreement to construct a new refinery near Homs with a production capacity of 140,000 b/d. Furthermore, Iran had plans to rehabilitate the deteriorating Banias refinery, but both plans fell through with the collapse of the Assad regime and Iran’s subsequent withdrawal from the country.

Syria currently has two active refineries located at Banias, with a production capacity of 120,000 b/d, and one at Homs, which has a production capacity of 107,100 b/d; the current state of the two refineries is uncertain given the destruction of war and the inability of Syria to reliably maintain the infrastructure over the years. Furthermore, due to the lack of record keeping and immediate transparency, it is unclear how much each refinery is currently producing, with one estimation being that both refineries are processing a combined 70,000 b/d, which covers a fraction of Syria’s electricity consumption.

Syria’s oil fields are located predominantly in the east near the Iraqi border. They are primarily under the control of SDF’s military arm, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is backed by the United States but considered a terrorist organization by Turkey and Qatar; YPG’s future under a new Syrian government remains complicated and uncertain. With control of approximately 70% of the country’s oil fields, taken during the 2017 campaigns against ISIS, SDF has considerable leverage moving forward with ongoing negotiations for integrating into a new Syria. However, it is unlikely that SDF has any intention of fully dissolving its independent identity. Still, it may consider incorporating into a new Syrian military bloc if a decentralized administrative state is developed.
Syria’s Electricity Crisis
Most of Syria’s electricity is produced by fossil fuels, including 57.3% from oil and 38.4% from natural gas in 2022. A lack of unity and the dismal conditions of the country’s electrical grid and refineries have caused a major supply chain crisis and nationwide electricity shortages. Omar Shaqrouq, Syria’s new electricity minister, estimates that they can only currently generate 1,500 megawatts of power, which has forced the transitional government to limit daily usage to two hours.

The electricity crisis underscores Syria’s vulnerability to further instability and foreign influence. The longer it takes for Damascus to stabilize the electrical grid, the more likely it is for civil unrest and governmental infighting to re-ignite. Perceiving the national security threat that would ensue if Syria were to become a failed state, the United States announced a six-month sanctions exemption from entities performing energy-related transactions with the new transitional government to bolster humanitarian relief. This exemption has allowed neighboring countries, such as Turkey, Jordan, and Qatar, to pledge further assistance in supporting Syria’s electricity demand. Some of this assistance has included two electricity-producing ships from Turkey and Qatar, capable of providing 800 megawatts of power, and a pledge from Jordan to prepare the infrastructure needed to plug Syria into their grid at the Nasib border crossing.
What happens in Syria will have an impact on the United States due to America’s military presence there. On Dec. 19th, 2024, it was reported by the Department of Defense that the United States now has approximately 2,000 military personnel, 1,100 more than what was previously reported. Since 2016, America’s military base on the Syria-Iraq border, Al-Tanf, has been critical to counter-ISIS operations and in the training of Syrian opposition forces. Given the ongoing instability and uncertainty regarding Syria’s future, the longer there is an American military presence in the country, the greater the chance for conflict and for the United States to be dragged into another war it does not need to be a part of.
Fortunately, the new Trump administration has signaled a shift in geopolitical strategy that seeks to limit these sorts of foreign military engagements. Historically, U.S. military presence, particularly in the Middle East, has been partly driven by the need to secure global access to oil resources. In recent years, however, the U.S. has become less dependent on foreign oil due to increased domestic energy production, particularly from shale oil and natural gas (also known as the shale boom). While other geopolitical interests remain, increased energy production in the U.S. promises to reduce the need for military intervention specifically aimed at securing global energy supply chains, even when those military operations are taking place in non-major energy producing countries, like Syria.
Conclusion
Over a decade of civil war has left the Syrian economy in shambles. Syria has significant natural resource reserves, including enough oil and gas to cover domestic demand and export to and generate revenue from global markets. The overthrow of the Assad regime means that Syria has a chance to redefine its nation and chart a new course toward unity and economic freedom. Challenges include creating a new national identity, negotiating with multiple internal factions and foreign powers, and keeping their promise to form a reliable and moderate representative government for Syria’s estimated 25 million citizens. Given the security risk of Syria falling into further disarray and conflict, foreign assistance will likely continue. However, the longer it takes for Syria to redefine itself and rebuild, the higher the likelihood of a resurgence of hostilities.