As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues into its third brutal year, and the U.S. government presses for a resolution to the conflict, it is worth taking a step back and considering the lens through which we view the war itself.
“Proxy war” is a term invoked by government officials, analysts, pundits, and scholars to describe the conflict in Ukraine. The label was notably used by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his criticism of U.S. policy as early as December 2022. While Putin was trying to influence American and global audiences by conveying a specific message, the term has long been used in serious analysis and policy discussion, perhaps most often by well-intentioned thinkers seeking to understand and describe the nature of war.
This creates the question—does this accurately describe the war in Ukraine, and is the term “proxy war” at all useful in the first place?
The answer is no. The term proxy war is unhelpful in regards to the Ukraine war specifically, and can lead us astray when thinking about other conflicts as well. It misses the mark in two ways: It deprives the parties involved of their agency, and it oversimplifies the often-complex relationships among all sides. From a practical perspective, these mistakes can translate into ineffective policies with bad outcomes.
What does ‘proxy war’ even mean?
“Proxy war” means different things to different people. In the lexicon of international relations, it can refer to a country taking an action—such as going to war—at the behest of another country. It can also refer to a group that acts on behalf of another country. The term is generally used to describe situations where one country is providing military support to a country or group engaged in a military conflict. While this is exactly what the United States and its allies are doing with regard to Ukraine, labeling the conflict as a “proxy war,” however, mischaracterizes both the nature of that support and the larger dynamics of the conflict.
The term “proxy war” carries a principal-agent connotation. Principal-agent theory describes how one actor (in this case, a country) delegates a task to another actor (a country or a group). Each has its own interests that are to some extent aligned with the other’s. The agent, however, may choose to diverge from the principal’s wishes. The principal can invest only so much in controlling the choices of the agent to keep the relationship cost-effective. Both, therefore, will stay within certain bounds while the agent gets away with as much as they can while still reaping benefits.
When we apply this lens to an international conflict, we can come away with the mistaken impression that one actor is the client of another. In some cases, there is a real power dynamic between the two. The country providing military support is doing so for a certain set of interests. The country receiving the support may share only some of those interests. Each country may try to leverage its role in the relationship to achieve some of its goals. In this respect, the term proxy war has some utility in the case of Ukraine and in other instances. Iran, for example, provides support to Yemen’s Houthis, as well as a broad range of other actors. In some cases, the relationship between Iran and terrorist groups that it sponsors is close (such as Hezbollah) or less so (such as Hamas). Russia, for its part, supported the insurgency in Ukraine’s east. To be sure the “separatists” in Donetsk and Luhansk are responsive to Russia.
Despite the fact that there may be a principal-agent dynamic in play in any such relationship, it is rarely the only or even the most important aspect of the conflict. The term “proxy” implies a strict sponsor-client relationship, or that one group is acting as an extension of another. This is not the case in most wars, as scholars such as Vladimir Rauta, Reinoud Leenders, and Antonio Giustozzi have argued.
First of all, all actors in a conflict have agency. Just because a country or group is receiving military support from another actor does not mean that it automatically adopts all of their interests and preferences, a case that Barbara Elias has expertly argued with regard to the U.S. military’s many partnerships around the world. Secondly, when we use the term “proxy,” we forget that external actors can intervene in conflicts for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways. Rather than oversimplifying the conflict as a “proxy war,” we should look carefully at these particular relationships.
A historical example: The Spanish Civil War
The Spanish Civil War offers an example of a conflict that is often mischaracterized as a proxy war. The war started in 1936 when the Spanish military launched a coup against the democratically elected government. The Spanish Army provided the mainstay of a Nationalist force, which consisted of a broad “right-wing” coalition of fascists and monarchists, each with their own ideological and political goals. These groups coalesced into a relatively cohesive force and maintained support from Italy and Germany throughout the war. On the other side was the Spanish Republic. The “left-wing” government consisted of everything from moderate liberals to radical socialists. The war also saw a broad left-wing uprising of anarchists, communists, and even federalists seeking regional autonomy within a democratic nation. This side received support from Stalin’s Soviet Union, which persisted until 1939 when the Nationalists eventually won and dictator Francisco Franco began his 36-year rule.
The war is often described as a binary ideological struggle of fascism against communism, or as a power struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union. What this misses is that the Nationalist force was never a proxy of Hitler, nor was the Republic a proxy of Stalin. Using “proxy war” as shorthand prevents serious thinking about the roots of the conflict, as is reflected in Antony Beevor’s excellent history.
For example, if one does not understand how the military class (with its own institutions and interests) came to launch a coup against the government and why monarchists joined their coalition, they lose a sense of how the balance of military power may have influenced these groups to align as they did. They might also overlook the right-wing populist narrative that led many working-class Spaniards to fight in the Nationalist army, and how they coalesced around an ethno-religious narrative. One might fail to understand how communists influenced Republican forces, who at the beginning of the war included moderate liberals steadfastly opposed to communism.
Focusing on the tension between the Soviet Union and Germany also overlooks the differences between these two powers in why and how they intervened in the war. As historian Robert H. Whealey describes it, Germany may have pursued economic and diplomatic interests ahead of ideological ones. While the Soviet Union did seek to check Hitler’s expansion, it had other goals in mind, namely a modus vivendi with other European powers after its own civil war. Both countries provided arms, advisers, and even air forces, throughout the war. After the civil war, Franco’s Spain did not fight alongside the Nazis in World War II.
At the time, many international audiences saw the conflict as one of democracy against fascism. This was only partially true, as both belligerents were ideologically diverse and only partially influenced by their external backers. During the civil war, for example, the splintering of Basque communities among multiple factions had a lot to do with a desire for local autonomy.
Those in the United States that saw the war primarily through the lens of Germany’s power struggle with the Soviet Union, or who viewed the Nationalists and Republicans simply as clients of their backers failed to understand the war. In reality, the Spanish Civil War was fought by coalitions pursuing their own interests. External backers shaped the conflict, but were never fully in control.
Why Ukraine is not a proxy war.
This brings us back to the war in Ukraine, a very different situation from the Spanish Civil War. Most obviously, it is a war between two states rather than a civil war. Still, some refer to it as a proxy war as the United States continues to provide support, along with NATO, the European Union, and other allies. Russia, for its part, also receives economic support from China, weapons from Iran, and soldiers from North Korea. The broad coalition supporting Ukraine generally shares a belief in democratic values and norms regarding state sovereignty. To one degree or another, they also wish to deter future Russian aggression and foster an international system more conducive to their national and collective security. Those supporting Russia share very different goals, that may involve countering U.S. influence. At first glance, one could conclude that the war is really about a power struggle between one faction led by the United States and another led by Russia. As was the case with Spain, this is an incorrect characterization.
First, to call this a proxy war deprives all parties of agency, most of all the Ukrainians. To refer to Ukraine as a “proxy” would suggest that they entered into the war at the U.S.’s direction, or that they are acting as a stand-in for the United States. Nothing could be further from the truth. Ukraine is fighting because Russia invaded its territory, seeking to overthrow the elected government and erase its existence as a nation. In this case, Ukraine’s only real option is to fight for survival. It also implies that the United States has a high degree of control over Ukraine’s choices. While U.S. military support undoubtedly creates a power dynamic between the two nations, they are both very much independent actors.
Secondly, it misses the different dynamics among all the actors involved. China likely has a different reason for acting as Russia’s economic lifeline than North Korea does in providing troops. Iran, for its part, operates in a very different strategic context from the other two nations. Each is willing and able to provide a different kind and level of support based on their interests, which are loosely aligned in opposition to American power. In this way, there is a different set of factors shaping the actions of each country involved.
If the idea of “proxy war” is discarded, the situation in Ukraine comes into clearer focus. Such labeling emphasizes an adversarial dynamic between the United States and Russia, neglecting that the U.S. objective in Ukraine for the last three years has been not to weaken Russia but defend Ukraine. Prior to 2014, the United States had largely sought to improve relations with Russia. Even after the seizure of Crimea, U.S. support to Ukraine increased in a way that suggests a desire to avoid escalation, with lethal arms sales not beginning until 2017. Emphasizing Ukraine’s dependency on U.S. support similarly ignores the reality that Ukraine is fighting of its own accord. While the United States is enabling Ukraine in important ways, the Ukrainians would have to fight regardless. American support, although perhaps vital, is not the only support Ukraine is receiving.
If the war is not primarily about a power struggle with Russia, nor U.S. leverage over Ukraine, then U.S. policy should focus on the challenge at hand: supporting Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity. Three years into a terrible war, it may be time for the United States to develop an approach focused on the Russian invasion itself. The first step would be to take stock of the operational situation within Ukraine, and then develop a clear strategy as to how American diplomatic, economic, and military power can be matched to Ukrainian needs in a way that renders Russia incapable of achieving its military objectives. Such an approach could be coordinated with the Ukrainians, and possibly a broader network of allies, who may be positioned to provide niche capabilities, share the resource burden, and leverage their unique strengths.
The idea of proxy war usually falls short of characterizing the complex dynamics of any military conflict. Academics and analysts should exercise caution when thinking of one country or group as a “proxy” for another, or of a conflict as a “proxy war” between two powers. Policy makers, especially, should beware of adopting this lens. Whether confronting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or Iran’s support of terrorism, the United States should always be aware that every party in a conflict has their own interests and the agency to pursue them. With this in mind, U.S. policy makers can begin to untangle the complex relationships that shape the course of war. Only then can the United States act in a way that promotes its values and advances its national security interests.
